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1. INTRODUCTION
Climate change is a serious threat, and it demands prompt policy response (Stern, 2008) .
Political commitment to address the issue is critical, yet sources of large differences in such commitments across countries are not fully uncovered. This paper focuses on the relevance of political identity, and in particular, the gender of politicians. We ask whether representation of females in political decision-making contributes to climate change policy action around the world.
That politician's gender identity may have implications for policy outcomes has been established in the literature. Studies have shown that female political representation contributes to significant changes in domestic and international policies including higher spending on health (Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014; Mavisakalyan, 2014) and education (Svaleryd, 2009; Clots-Figueras, 2012) , more laws and expenditures relevant to female needs (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Clots-Figueras, 2011) , higher disbursements of foreign aid (Hicks et al., 2015 (Hicks et al., , 2016 . Furthermore, female politicians have been associated with outcomes such as better quality of institutions (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001) and higher rates of economic growth (Jayasuriya and Burke, 2013) . While the existing studies on the determinants of climate change policies across countries have highlighted the relevance of countries' formal and informal institutions (Fredriksson and Neumayer, 2013; Fredriksson and Wollscheid, 2015; Ang and Fredriksson, 2017; , to the best of our knowledge the role of politicians' identity has not received dedicated attention in this literature.
Gender differences in attitudes towards climate change identified in the general public suggest that females have greater awareness and concern about climate change than males do (McCright, 2010; McCright and Dunlap, 2011) . Based on theories of gender socialisation, these differences can be linked to differences in values and social expectations conferred through socialization whereby cooperation and carefulness -values relevant for climate change action -are more emphasized in females than in males (Gilligan, 1982; Beutel and Marini, 1995) . Gender differences in climate change concern can also be linked to differences in social roles performed in the society with production of climate change seen to be more closely linked to activities performed by males than females (Spitzner, 2009 ). Furthermore, consequences of climate change are likely to be gender-differentiated as well, with females more disproportionately bearing the costs of climate change due to their 'gendered labour and care roles and social status' (Seager et al., 2016, p.13) . 2 In 'citizen candidates' models, in the absence of complete political commitment, politicians implement policies consistent with their preferences (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997) . However, it is unclear whether we should expect to observe gender differences in preferences of politicians similar to those observed in the general public.
Indeed, it is possible that females who pursue leadership roles in a predominantly male environment are similar to males (Adams and Funk, 2012) . Consistent with this proposition, Sundstrom and McCright (2014) do not find robust evidence for gender differences in environmental concerns among Swedish parliamentarians although such gender differences are observed in the general public in Sweden. In the context of the US, however, Fredriksson and Wang (2011) find that female parliamentarians in the House of Representatives have more pro-environmental views compared to their male counterparts. Building on these observations, our study evaluates the implications of female representation in politics for climate change policies adopted by countries around the world.
From an econometric perspective, we are confronted with a problem of omitted variables: adoption of climate change policies and election of females to parliament may both be the product of underlying characteristics of countries we do not observe. We employ two key strategies to ascertain that our estimates are not driven by confounding factors. First, we use an instrumental variable based on countries' history of female political empowerment and estimate a 2SLS model. Second, we use a partial identification approach proposed by Oster (2016) . The main idea of this approach is to study how large would the amount of selection on unobservables need to be, relative to the amount of selection on observables, to explain away the entire casual effect of female representation.
Based on a large sample of countries, we document a robust positive association between female representation in a country's parliament and the stringency of its climate change policies. The impact we identify is statistically significant and economically meaningful. As an illustration, our 2SLS estimation results imply that lifting the female representation in Bahrain, a country where females comprised just over 2% of parliamentarians in the study period, to the level of Denmark, a country with over 37% female representation, could lead to a 6-fold increase in the stringency of the country's climate change policies (in practice Denmark's climate change policies are around 8 times as stringent as Bahrain's). In extended results, we further demonstrate that through its effects on the stringency of climate change policies, female parliamentary representation results in lower carbon dioxide emissions.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the data used in the study. This is followed by a discussion of our empirical approach and the results 3 of baseline analysis in section 3. In section 4 we test the sensitivity of the results to the choice of control and dependent variables, and functional form, while section 5 is dedicated to addressing the issue of endogeneity employing instrumental variable and partial identification approaches. We extend the analysis to study the implications of female representation for carbon dioxide emissions in section 6. The final section concludes.
DATA
We assemble a dataset for a sample of up to 91 countries based on various sources. Table   1 specifies the sources and presents summary statistics for the variables used in the baseline analysis.
Our measure of climate change policies is Climate Laws, Institutions and Measures Index used in other published studies (e.g., Neumayer, 2013, 2016) . CLIMI measures the climate change mitigation policies adopted by countries. It is based on 12 components grouped into four key policy areas, with weights used to reflect the contribution of (1)]. CLIMI ranges from 0 and 1, with higher values representing stricter policies. The average CLIMI score in the sample is 0.350. Tonga has the lowest CLIMI score in the sample at 0.011, while the UK has the highest score at 0.801.
[ Table 1 about here.]
To capture the representation of females in politics we use the number of seats held by female members in single or lower chambers of national parliaments, expressed as a percentage of all occupied seats (Female in Parliament). Since CLIMI is measured based on information collected over the period 2005-2010, this and other time-variant variables in our analysis are averaged over this time period. The proportion of females in parliament in the sample averages at 19.25% (ranging from 0 to 52.55%). To substantiate on this relationship, our baseline analysis controls for several important characteristics of countries as highlighted in previous studies on the determinants of climate change policies. Following Neumayer (2013, 2016) , we control for countries' GDP per capita and openness (defined as imports plus exports divided by GDP).
While the demand for climate change policies is expected to increase with GDP per capita, the expected effect of countries' openness on the stringency of climate change policies is ambiguous. As Neumayer (2002) points out, openness may contribute to cooperation on environmental problems, however it may also hamper it if exporting countries' interests are threatened. Following Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013) , we additionally control for countries' per capita carbon emissions (CO 2 emissions per capita) -a variable that 'reflects the amount at stake for CO 2 emitters and thus their lobbying incentives' (p. 14). 1 The literature has highlighted the role of institutions in determining countries' commitments to address climate change. Countries' political regime is one important factor, with democracies promoting the enactment of environmental regulations more than autocracies do (e.g., Murdoch and Sandler, 1997; Farzin and Bond, 2006) . Our analysis includes measures of countries' political regimes based on Polity IV data set (Marshall et al., 2016) . The polity score captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). We convert this into three regime categories, distinguishing between autocracies (-10 to -6), democracies (+6 to +10), and other regime types (Marshall et al., 2016) . In our sample, 64% of the countries are democracies while 12% are autocracies (the remaining 24% have other political regimes).
Legal heritage of countries has been identified as a determinant of a broad range of its legal rules, regulations, and a number of other outcomes (La Porta et al., 2008) . There is also evidence that it affects climate change policy outcomes across countries (Fredriksson and Wollscheid, 2015; Ang and Fredriksson, 2017) . Legal origins are usually divided into two main groups: English common law and civil law; the later has four sub-strands: French, German, Scandinavian, and Socialist legal traditions (La Porta et al., 1998 . Our analysis includes controls for these legal origins. Around 40% of the countries in the sample have French legal origin. Socialist legal origin underlies almost 31% of the countries, followed 1 The results are not sensitive to dropping this variable from the analysis. 5 by English legal origin shared by nearly 19% of countries. German and Scandinavian legal origin groups are small: each of these groups comprises only 5% of countries in the sample.
BASELINE RESULTS
To evaluate the baseline effect of the proportion of females in parliament on climate change policy of country i, we estimate the following model using ordinary least squares (OLS):
where FemParliament i is the proportion of females in a country's parliament, X i is a vector of controls for economic and institutional characteristics of countries defined in section 2, and ε i is a disturbance term.
The OLS estimates of equation 1 are presented in Table 2 . Column (1) presents a parsimonious specification which excludes other controls. Consistent with Figure 1 , we estimate a positive highly significant coefficient on Female in Parliament with a magnitude suggesting a 0.10 point increase in CLIMI associated with a 10 unit increase in Female in Parliament.
Next, in column (2), we control for countries' GDP per capita and their openness. Introducing these controls into the regression leaves the sign and statistical significance of the coefficient on Female in Parliament unaffected, although the magnitude of the coefficient is slightly smaller. This is not surprising given the observations on the positive link between countries' economic development and socioeconomic status of females (Duflo, 2012) . Countries with higher GDP per capita have more stringent climate change policies as captured by CLIMI. Openness on the other hand, is negatively associated with CLIMI although this estimate is not robust to introducing additional controls in subsequent specifications.
Column (3) presents the results with CO 2 emissions per capita added to the list of controls.
The coefficient on Female in Parliament is unaffected. CO 2 emissions per capita is negatively correlated with CLIMI. This is consistent with findings in Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013) and suggests that anti-climate change policy lobbying is successfull in places with large CO 2 emissions per capita.
The characteristics of countries' political regime are added as controls in column (4). Reassuringly, the estimated positive significant coefficient on Female in Parliament remains robust to including these controls although it's magnitude is reduced -an effect that is consistent with findings on positive association between the level of democracy and female parliamentary representation (Paxton et al., 2010) . We establish that democracies, relative to other political regimes, have more stringent climate change policies. This is in line with 6 other findings in the literature (e.g., Murdoch and Sandler, 1997; Farzin and Bond, 2006) .
The effect of autocracies on the stringency of climate change policies is indistinguishable from zero.
Finally, in column (5) we include controls for the legal heritage of countries. We confirm the positive significant coefficient on female parliamentary representation in this specification. A 10 unit increase in the female share of parliament is associated with 0.05 point increase in CLIMI. This effect persists, in spite of the findings in the literature on the positive effect of Scandinavian legal origin on female parliamentary representation (Austen and Mavisakalyan, 2016) .
In column (6) we undertake to evaluate whether the results we find might be sensitive to the presence of influential observations. To identify these, we calculate DFbetas for CLIMI from baseline regression in column (5) and drop those observations for which |DFbeta|>2/ √ N (Belsley et al., 1980) . The results are remarkably similar to those reported in column (5) thereby confirming that the positive significant association between female parliamentary representation and the stringency of climate change policies we find is not driven by influential observations in the sample.
[ Table 2 about here.]
To assess the robustness of the results with regard to collinearity, we refer to Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) based on the baseline regression in column (5) of Table 2 . The VIFs of the control variables reported in Table 3 do not reveal serious collinearity problems; all variables are well below the rule of thumb VIF value of 10 (Marquaridt, 1970; Neter et al., 1989; Kennedy, 1992) .
[ Table 3 about here.]
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Additional controls. We have established a positive and statistically significant relationship between female representation in parliament and the stringency of climate change policies across countries. Yet, the possibility that female representation simply acts as a marker of unobserved characteristics of countries cannot be ruled out at this stage of the analysis. To mitigate this possibility, we control for additional variables that could be correlated with the unexplained component of CLIMI. The results of this exercise are summarised in Table 4 . To allow for comparisons, in column (1) we report the estimation results of the baseline model (these are identical to those presented in column (5) of Table 2 ). 7 Average years of schooling in the population is one variable potentially correlated with the unexplained component of CLIMI. Research has documented that the prevalence of gender discriminatory attitudes around work decreases with education (e.g., Mavisakalyan, 2015) . Meanwhile, education is also positively associated with pro-environmental behaviour (e.g., Franzen and Meyer, 2010; . Indeed, we estimate a positive coefficient on average years of schooling (sourced from Barro and Lee (2013) ). It is however statistically insignificant in this particular estimation, while the estimated coefficient on Female in Parliament is unchanged (column (2)).
Our baseline regressions control for important institutional features of countries. However there may be other characteristics of countries' institutional environment potentially correlated with both Female in Parliament and CLIMI. Most crucially perhaps, Female in Parliament may be simply picking up the effect of left-wing orientation in political power, which has been linked with pro-environmental outcomes (e.g., Neumayer, 2003 Neumayer, , 2004 . To address this possibility, we control for the political orientation of the national leader's party available from Keefer (2012) . 2 Countries' historical experience of democracy is another important factor that has been linked with outcomes related to both gender equality (Beer, 2009 ) as well as climate change policies (Fredriksson and Neumayer, 2013) . We therefore additionally control for a measure of democratic capital stock accumulated in years 1800-2010 that comes from Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013) . The results of the model that controls for these additional institutional variables are presented in column (3). The estimated coefficients on both are statistically insignificant. The estimate on Female in Parliament is remarkably similar to that from the baseline model.
Another possibility we consider is that countries with preference for female representation may simply have more policies in general. In the absence of a direct measure for the number of policies in a country, we consider a proxy limited to a certain domain: business regulation environments. Doing Business country rankings sourced from the World Bank (2018) cover 10 areas of business regulations across countries -starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency -and capture both quantity and quality aspects of the rules. Admittedly, this measure is narrowly focused and does not cover the full range of policies and institutions that comprise the regulatory environment in a country. It is perhaps to some extent for that reason, that we estimate an insignificant coefficient on Doing Business ranking (column 4); 2 The source classifies parties as left if their names reveal them to be communist, socialist, or social democratic or if they are labeled as left-wing (Beck et al., 2001) . 8 however it has a negative sign suggesting that complexity of the regulatory environment in this area is negatively correlated with the stringency of climate change policies. We continue to observe a significant positive coefficient on Female in Parliament, while its magnitude is smaller compared to the baseline estimate.
The significance of history in determining contemporary outcomes may manifest through channels other than those hitherto considered. History of colonialism is one possible channel, having been linked with gender inequality (Mavisakalyan, 2015) as well as with environmental outcomes of countries (Marchand, 2012) . The results reported in column (5) Next we consider whether our results may be the outcome of omitting important geoeconomic characteristics of countries. We first control for the countries' natural resource wealth as measured by the net value of their oil and gas exports taken from Ross and Mahdavi (2015) . The literature has documented a negative link between oil and gas wealth and female political participation (Ross, 2008; . Resource production, however, also bears important implications for the climate change policies countries implement given the traditionally strong opposition from the oil and gas industry. We additionally control for latitude -a variable that has been linked with Western European influence and quality of institutions (Hall and Jones, 1999) as well as directly capturing important geographic differences across countries (Rodrik et al., 2004) . Column (6) reports the results of the regression that controls for these variables. We confirm the positive significant coefficient on Female in Parliament. The estimated coefficient on Oil & Gas net export per capita, while negative, is statistically insignificant in this specification. We estimate a positive significance coefficient on Latitude of capital, however it is not robust to subsequent alterations to the list of controls.
Further, in column (7) we control for small island states (source: World Bank (2016)) and climate vulnerability (source: Wheeler (2011)) -variables that have been considered in the literature to account for the demand for climate change policies (Fredriksson and Neumayer, 2013 Finally, in the last column of Table 4 , we include dummies for continents. After controlling for important socio-economic, institutional and geographic characteristics of countries, the only significant effect we estimate is on the dummy for South America: the climate change policies in the countries of this continent are on average less stringent compared to those in African countries. The estimated positive effect of Female in Parliament on CLIMI persists after these characteristics of countries have been accounted for.
[ Table 4 about here.]
As another attempt to test the robustness of our central result on the link between Female in Parliament and CLIMI to the choice of control variables included in the model, we make further alterations to the list of controls. In Table 5 , we report the results of the regressions with baseline and additional lists of controls where we replace: (i) GDP per capita with the Human Development Index by the United Nations Development Programme (2018) [ We start with OECD's Environmental Policy Stringency Index (EPS) -a measure that captures the degree of stringency of 14 environmental policy instruments, primarily related to climate and air pollution (Botta and Kozluk, 2014) . The data is available for the period from 1990-2012, however it is limited to 27 OECD and 6 BRICS countries. 5 The results presented in the first column of Table 7 confirm the positive significant relationship between Female in Parliament and this measure of environmental policies. Consistent with the baseline results, we also observe a positive significant relationship between a country's per capita GDP and the stringency of its environmental policies, while the effect of per capita CO2 emissions is negative.
We consider another policy stringency measure -the Climate Policy Index (CPI) developed by Künkel et al. (2006) . This index measures climate policy performance and draws on 'quantitative and qualitative information on national climate policies by sector' for three IV score is dropped from the estimation. 11 however, that this analysis precedes that on CLIMI, and changes in climate policies across a number of countries over time may also explain the differences in the results (Surminski and Williamson, 2012) .
Finally, we draw on data from Germanwatch to utilise the climate policy ingredients of their Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) as our outcome measures. The index evaluates the climate protection performance of 58 countries that are, together, responsible for more than 90 percent of global energy-related CO2 emissions (Burck et al., 2014) . The climate policy components of the overall index are based on assessments by country experts on the extent and quality of each country's commitment to climate policies and regulations.
There are particularly sharp differences in the measurement criteria used in the construction of these policy ingredients of CCPI and CLIMI, with the correlation coefficient between the overall policy ingredient and CLIMI of 0.19 (Surminski and Williamson, 2012 (3) and (4) [ Table 7 about here.]
Non-parametric analysis. It can be argued that the OLS method imposes some restrictive assumptions on the model specification. Here we relax two of these assumptions; namely assumptions regarding the normal distribution of residuals and the functional form relating the main independent variable to CLIMI.
First, we re-examine the relationship between Female in Parliament and CLIMI, relaxing the assumption on normally distributed residuals (i.e. ε i ). We do so by estimating the model with quantile regression method. By doing that, we also test the robustness of the results against extreme values of our dependent variable. In quantile regression, the sample is divided into quantiles based on the distribution of dependent variable and therefore the main model (i.e. equation 1) becomes:
for all i = 1, ..., N.
In equation 2, as an arbitrary combination, δ can be 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 quantiles. The relevant results are reported in Table 8 . The results corresponding to the first quantile, 0.25, suggest that the effect is not present; however, when we move to the centre of distribution, 0.5 quantile, the effect of Female in Parliament is significant. Results for the last qunatile, 0.75, show significant effect, although with slightly smaller magnitude.
[ 
In comparison to equation 1, equation 3 is more flexible as f (.) can accommodate different functional forms. We allow functional form to be different for every point of FemParliament i and estimate the model using Gaussian Kernel. Figure 2 illustrates the estimates of f (.) and as shown, the effect is always positive and within the confidence intervals. 7
[ Figure 2 about here.]
ADDRESSING ENDOGENEITY
Employing an instrument. The previous sections have established a rather robust statistically significant positive relationship between female representation in parliament and the stringency of climate change policies across countries. However, whether this finding can be given a causal interpretation can be questioned because of unobserved heterogeneity: places that are different for a variety of unobserved reasons will differ in their political representation of females as well as in their climate change policy outcomes. In section 4, we made an attempt to mitigate the problem of unobserved heterogeneity by adding proxy variables that could be correlated with the unexplained component of CLIMI, however obviously, unobserved heterogeneity can never be fully accounted for. A conventional way to deal with this problem is to use an instrumental variable, a source of exogenous variation in Female in Parliament, and estimate a 2SLS model. This is what we undertake to do here.
We exploit the electoral experience of females in society, as proxied by the years since female suffrage was granted, as an instrument to identify the effect of Female in Parliament. 7 In the estimation of the relationship for Figure 2 the baseline control variables (i.e. X i ) are considered in their linear form. Results are available upon request. 13 Sourced from UN Women (2011), this instrument has been used in other identification approaches applied to different contexts (Grier and Maldonado, 2015; Hicks et al., 2016) . The intuition in doing so is simple: a country's history of suffrage should be highly relevant for female exposure to politics, however it is unlikely that it directly affects its contemporary policy outcomes. As an informal way of testing this, in column (2) of Table 9 , we report the results of a regression of Years since suffrage on CLIMI which excludes Female in Parliament as a regressor (column (1) presents the OLS estimates of the effect of Female in Parliament on CLIMI; these are identical to those presented in column (5) of Table 2 
.). The coefficient on
Years since suffrage is positive and significant, however it turns insignificant once Female in Parliament is controlled for in column (3) suggesting that the effect of our instrument on the dependent variable is likely to operate through its effect on the endogenous variable.
The 2SLS estimates of equation 1 are presented in columns (4) and (5) of Table 9 . Female in Parliament is treated as endogenous and modeled as:
where Su f f rage i is the number of years since female suffrage was granted in a country, X i is a vector of controls for economic and institutional characteristics of countries defined in section 2, and ω i is a disturbance term.
The first stage estimation results reported in column (4) further support the validity of our identification strategy: we estimate a highly significant positive association between the years since suffrage and female parliamentary representation. 8 In defense of our identification strategy, the statistics for the weak identification test (Kleibergen and Paap (2006) F statistics) provides no evidence that the instrument we use is weak or irrelevant.
Column (5) female parliamentary representation on the stringency of climate change policies however it is much smaller than the actual gap in the stringency of climate change policies between the two countries.
[ Table 9 about here.]
An IV estimation can be potentially more convincing in a dataset that varies over time.
Since this is not feasible for CLIMI, a cross-sectional measure, we employ EPS, the measure of environmental policy stringency from OECD (2016) introduced earlier, in a 2SLS panel fixed effects regression. The results are reported in Table 10 . The baseline OLS results are reported in column (1) (these are identical to those reported in column (1) of Table 7 ). We confirm the significant explanatory power of Years since suffrage in explaining Female in Parliament in the first stage results in column (2). The statistically significant relationship between Female in Parliament and EPS persists in the second stage.
[ Here we take an alternative strategy to assess the potential impact of unobserved heterogeneity: we use a partial identification approach proposed by Oster (2016) to evaluate how large would the amount of selection on unobservables need to be, relative to the amount of selection on observables, to explain away the entire causal effect of Female in Parliament on CLIMI. To do that, we evaluate the bias-adjusted coefficient derived by Oster (2016):
whereβ andṘ are the coefficient and the R-squared from estimating the equation 1 where α = 0 andβ andR are the coefficient and R-squared from the regression where α = 0, i.e. other explanatory variables for CLIMI, in addition to Female in Parliament, are included.
δ denotes the relative importance of observable relative to unobservable variables in generating bias; R max is the R-squared from a hypothetical regression of CLIMI on all observable and unobservable variables. Both of these measures are unknown. Hence, Oster (2016) proposes a bounding approach: the estimated effect of Female in parliament should range fromβ to β * estimated under an assumption of δ = 1, and given values of R max ∈ [R, 1]. 15 We apply two assumptions on the value of R max : (i) R max = 0.90, i.e. that the measurement error in CLIMI accounts for 10% of the variation therein; (ii) R max = min{1.3R, 1} -the rule of thumb proposed by Oster (2016) .
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 11 . In columns (2) and (4) we report the coefficient bounds [β, β * ] for models with baseline and comprehensive lists of controls (corresponding to those reported in column (5) of Table 2 and column (8) of Table 4 ).β comes from the specifications controlling for all baseline/comprehensive observables. β * is evaluated using equation (5) by setting δ = 1 and applying the two assumptions on the value of R max . The identified sets, [β, β * ] exclude zeros in all cases -a finding that suggests that at least some of the estimated effect of Female in Parliament might be causal. Furthermore, in columns (1) and (3) we observe that in all cases δ > 1, i.e. that the unobservables would have to be more important than the observables in explaining CLIMI; this finding provides further support to the validity of our results.
[ Table 11 about here.]
IMPLICATIONS FOR EMISSIONS
Female parliamentary representation appears to be a significant factor in explaining climate change policies across countries. Here we ask whether this finding has implications for actual outcomes: do the policy changes associated with female representation result in lower carbon dioxide emissions? To explore these relationships, we estimate the equations 1 and 4 jointly with the following equation determining carbon dioxide emissions, using 3SLS:
where CO2 i is the per capita carbon emissions of a country, C i is a sub-set of control variables included in X i in equation 1. In particular, for identification purposes, the measures of countries' legal origins are included in X i but not in C i , i.e. we assume that legal origins might affect CO2 emissions only through their effect on countries' environmental policies.
Another exclusion restriction from the model is that Female in Parliament does not affect CO2 emissions once CLIMI is taken into account. Similar approach has been adopted in other studies that focus on a single potential transmission mechanism at a time (e.g., Sylwester, 2000; Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001; Mavisakalyan, 2011) . D i contains two additional 16 determinants of CO2 that are excluded from equations 1 and 4: a squared term of GDP per capita and population density; ι i is a disturbance term.
The results of estimating equations 1, 4 and 6 simultaneously using 3SLS are summarised in (2) and (3), a 10 unit increase in female representation, through its effect on the stringency of climate change policies, results in 0.24 (=0.018*13.084) metric tones decrease of carbon dioxide emissions per capita.
[ Table 12 about here.]
CONCLUSION
The lack of political commitment to address climate change around the world warrants an inquiry into underlying sources. In this paper, we have asked whether the lack of female political representation may be one such source. Our results confirm that this is the case: female representation in national parliaments leads to more stringent climate change policies Künkel et al. (2006) in column (2), national and international policy components of Germanwatch's Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) in columns (3) and (4). Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. † PPP (constant 2011 international $). (2); and CO 2 emissions per capita in column (3). † The lists of other controls included in models (1) and (2) are identical to those included in 2SLS estimations reported in columns (4) and (5) of Table 9 . The list of other controls in model (3) includes controls for GDP per capite squaredterm and population density in addition to the controls reported in column (5) of Table 9 but with the exception of Female in Parliament, COs emissions per capita and dummies for legal origin. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The overall adjusted adjusted R 2 for the system is 0.984. The F-test of joint significance of all excluded variables in the system is 71.61.
